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Abstract
This paper presents a unied framework for understanding the determinants of both CEO
incentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modied
principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of
compensation. The models closed form solutions yield testable predictions for how incen-
tives should vary across rms under optimal contracting. In particular, our calibrations
show that the negative relationship between the CEOs e¤ective equity stake and rm
size is quantitatively consistent with e¢ ciency and need not reect rent extraction. Our
model and data both also imply that the dollar change in wealth for a percentage change
in rm value, scaled by annual pay, is independent of rm size. This may render it an
attractive incentive measure as it is comparable between rms and over time. The theory
also predicts a positive relationship between pay volatility and rm volatility, and that
risk and e¤ort a¤ect total pay along the cross-section but not in the aggregate. Finally,
we demonstrate that incentive compensation is e¤ective at solving large agency problems,
such as selecting corporate strategy, but smaller issues such as perk consumption are best
addressed through direct monitoring. (JEL: D2, D3, G34, J3)
aedmans@wharton.upenn.edu, xgabaix@stern.nyu.edu, alandier@stern.nyu.edu. For helpful com-
ments, we thank John Core, Ingolf Dittmann, Carola Frydman, Bob Gibbons, Ben Hermalin (a dis-
cussant), Dirk Jenter, Holger Mueller, Michael Roberts, Yuliy Sannikov, Merih Sevilir (a discussant),
Andrei Shleifer, Jeremy Stein, Youngsuk Yook and seminar participants at MIT, NYU, the NBER
Summer Institute, and the Washington University Conference on Corporate Finance. XG thanks the
NSF (DRU-0527518) for nancial support.
1
This paper presents a unied framework for understanding the determinants of both the level
and sensitivity of CEO pay in neoclassical market equilibrium. In our model, both elements
of compensation are simultaneously governed by the market for scarce talent and the nature
of the agency conict. Holding total pay constant, e¤ort considerations determine its division
into xed and performance-sensitive components. To endogenize the level of total pay, and
thus fully solve for the absolute level of incentive compensation, we embed this result into a
general equilibrium model of the competitive assignment of CEO talent. As in Gabaix and
Landier (2008), the most skilled CEOs are matched with the largest rms and earn the highest
salaries, leading to a positive association between total pay and rm size. Dollar incentive
compensation therefore also varies with size. We further extend the competitive assignment
model to incorporate risk aversion and allow for general contracts, deriving further implications
on the e¤ect of risk on pay and the e¤ectiveness of compensation in addressing agency problems.
The model has two key contributions over and above existing theories. First, while many
incentive models are partial equilibrium, taking the level of pay as given, we endogenize it
in market equilibrium to produce a single, parsimonious model of both incentives and total
pay. The model therefore combines many issues related to executive compensation in a single
framework, demonstrating how incentives and salary should optimally vary across companies,
between countries, and over time according to managerial talent, rm size, volatility and the
cost of e¤ort. Second, our model is particularly tractable and yields closed-form solutions.
These features remain when allowing for general incentive contracts and general risk-averse
utility functions. Indeed, the full market equilibrium can be summarized in just three simple
equations. Not only may this make the model an attractive benchmark on which future theories
can build, but it also leads to clear, quantitative empirical implications and thus readily lends
the model to empirical analysis.
We explore three such implications. The rst is the relationship between rm size and
wealth-performance sensitivity. This issue is important for at least two reasons. It has been
widely documented that the CEOs e¤ective equity stakeor dollar-dollar incentives (the
dollar change in wealth for a dollar change in rm value) are signicantly decreasing in rm
size (e.g. Jensen and Murphy (1990), Schaefer (1998)). Why is this? One interpretation is
that rent extraction is particularly pronounced in large rms, thus allowing incentives to be
suboptimally low (e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004)). If this argument is correct, the implications
are profound. If the CEOs in charge of the largest companies have the weakest incentives to
exert e¤ort, then billions of dollars of value may be lost each year. This explanation would also
imply a pressing need for intervention: the current system of pay determination is broken, and
must be xed.
Our model can be used to evaluate this hypothesis as it provide a quantitative benchmark
for how incentives should scale with size under optimal contracting. In our theory, e¤ort has
a multiplicative e¤ect on rm value, and so the dollar gains from working are proportional to
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size. The CEOs utility gain from shirking (in dollar terms) rises with wealth, but wealth only
has a 1/3 elasticity with size. Therefore, dollar-dollar incentives should have a size elasticity of
-2/3, which is very close to our empirical estimate of -0.58. Therefore, the observed negative
relationship is exactly what a frictionless model would predict a smaller e¤ective equity share is
su¢ cient to induce e¤ort in large companies. Note that unlike other determinants of incentives
studied by the literature, size can be measured with little error. This limits our exibility in
calibration, allowing the model to be subject to particularly close empirical scrutiny, and its
predictions to be rejectable.
Understanding the scaling of incentive measures with rm size is also important to evaluate
the various metrics available to empiricists. We demonstrate both theoretically and empirically
that scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (the dollar change in wealth for a percentage
change in rm value, scaled by annual pay) is invariant to rm size, unlike other commonly
used measures. This property may make it particularly attractive for empirical analysis, as it
is comparable across rms and over time.
Second, we examine the models implications for the e¤ect of rm risk on total pay, the level
of incentives, and pay volatility. Traditional theories have an unbounded level of e¤ort and so
optimal incentives are a trade-o¤ between the gains from working and the cost of risk-bearing.
Firm risk therefore reduces both the level of incentives and pay volatility. Our model features a
maximum level of e¤ort, which the rm always wishes to implement as the gains from e¤ort are
proportional to rm size, but the cost imposed on the CEO is proportional to his wage, which
is substantially smaller. Incentives are set to induce maximum e¤ort regardless of risk, and
so are independent of volatility. Since pay volatility equals the product of incentives and rm
risk, we predict a positive link between pay volatility and risk, contrary to calibrated existing
models but supported by our data.
For total pay, the theory predicts that variations in volatility generate cross-sectional salary
di¤erences as riskier rms have to pay a compensating di¤erential. We conrm this empirically.
However, market-wide increases in risk have negligible impact on the pay of the most talented
CEOs. Since the pay of top CEOs is only driven by rm size and the scarcity of CEO talent, it
is not compensation for aggregate-level risk. The e¤ects of disutility of e¤ort are very similar 
it explains pay di¤erences along the cross-section, but has no aggregate impact.
The third application of the model is to assess whether observed levels of incentive com-
pensation are e¤ective in solving agency problems. Jensen and Murphy (1990) nd that CEO
wealth falls by only $3.25 for every $1,000 loss in shareholder value. As this gure appears low,
it is frequently interpreted as evidence that current practices are inadequate to induce share-
holder value maximization (see however Hall and Liebman (1998)). Since this issue concerns
magnitudes, not directions, a calibratable model is particularly suited to shed light upon the
debate. We nd that observed incentives are able to deter suboptimal actions (such as shirking,
pursuit of pet projects, or empire-building acquisitions) if such behavior increases the CEOs
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utility by a monetary equivalent no greater than 0.9 times his annual wage. Since it appears
plausible that the private benets from most potential value-destructive actions fall below this
upper bound, incentives are able to solve the majority of agency problems. Apparently small
incentives can have substantial power because the disutility cost of e¤ort is proportional to the
managers consumption and thus his wealth, but its benet is proportional to rm value. Since
rm value is extremely large compared to the managers wealth, the dollar gains from e¤ort are
very high and so the manager only needs a small equity stake to achieve incentive compatibility.
While the above calibration focuses on the potency of current levels of incentives, a related
contribution is to analyze the e¤ectiveness of incentives in general (for any reasonable levels)
at addressing agency problems. The seminal model of Jensen and Meckling (1976) implies
that all agency issues can and should be solved by incentives, but we show that there are
certain problems for which compensation is ine¤ective. First, some actions may yield the CEO
substantial private benets, which may exceed the loss in wealth implied from any plausible
level of incentives. One example is managerial entrenchment by failing to (optimally) resign
voluntarily, the CEO may enjoy his salary and private benets of control for many future years.
Second, some actions may have too small an e¤ect on the rms stock returns for the CEOs
equity holdings to be sensitive. The core model considers actions which have a multiplicative
e¤ect on rm value (such as changes in strategy) and thus a¤ect stock returns, regardless of
rm size. However, certain actions such as perk consumption (e.g. the purchase of a corporate
jet) reduce rm value by a xed dollar amount, independent of size, and thus have a very small
e¤ect on the returns of a large company. The managers equity stake is thus insu¢ cient to
deter perks. When we allow for general contracts, perks can be deterred by using extremely
sensitive instruments, but these impose such a large risk-bearing cost on the manager that
total surplus falls. Hence, in our model, perk prevention has no explanatory power for incentive
compensation, and can only achieved through active corporate governance, e.g. direct rules
imposed on the CEO. Incentive compensation is e¤ective at solving large agency problems with
a signicant impact on returns, but smaller issues such as perk consumption are best addressed
through direct monitoring.
While individual predictions may be achievable from alternative models, to our knowledge
the combination of the above implications, plus the relationships between total pay and rm
size stated in Gabaix and Landier (2008), are unique to our unifying framework. Uniting all
of these predictions in a single parsimonious model is not the only advantage of endogenizing
both total pay and incentives together. Our market equilibrium approach generates results not
achievable by simply combining the conclusions of separate models of pay and incentives. In
particular, it allows us to understand the factors that do not determine CEO pay. For example,
we show that the CEOs incentives can be determined independently of the level of his overall
compensation the latter is entirely driven by forces in the managerial labor market. Therefore,
high overall pay does not come from the requirement to give the CEO strong incentives, but
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rather from the marginal productivity of CEO talent in market equilibrium. Even when risk
aversion is introduced, incentive considerations in the aggregate change the sensitivity of pay
to performance, but not expected pay. Conversely, talent determines the level of pay but not
its incentive component.
This paper builds on the empirical literature quantifying CEO incentives, and in particu-
lar their relationship with rm size. Jensen and Murphys (1990) seminal study showed that
CEOsdollar-dollar wealth-performance sensitivity is economically very small, particularly for
large rms. Schaefer (1998) later conrmed this negative scaling. Hall and Liebmans (1998)
more recent evidence illustrates that the recent rise in stock option compensation has signi-
cantly increased incentives since the Jensen and Murphy sample period. However, a rst-best
benchmark is necessary to evaluate whether they are now high enough.
The most closely related theory papers are calibrations of the CEO incentive problem. While
the main focus of our calibrations is the scaling of CEO incentives with size, Dittmann andMaug
(2007) and Armstrong, Larcker and Su (2007) explore the optimal structure of compensation,
in particular whether options are a feature of an e¢ cient remuneration package. Garicano and
Hubbard (2005) also calibrate a high-talent labor market, the market for lawyers. Gayle and
Miller (2007) explore the contribution of moral hazard to the rise in CEO pay. Baker and Halls
(2004) calibrations estimate the relationship between CEO productivity and rm size. They are
the rst to recognize that this relationship a¤ects the relevant measure of wealth-performance
sensitivity for use in empirical analysis. An analysis of percentage equity holdings implicitly
assumes the e¤ect of a CEOs actions is constant in dollar terms, but if the CEOs impact is
linear in rm size, the relevant variable is the managers dollar stake. However, neither measure
is stable across size, unlike our proposed metric. Their purpose is to estimate the scaling of
managerial productivity with size, not the e¤ect of size on incentives or the e¤ectiveness of
incentives at solving di¤erent types of agency problems.
Our paper di¤ers from the above papers owing to its contrasting objectives (principally,
the e¤ect of size on incentives) and its modeling approach (general equilibrium incorporating
both pay and incentives). The general equilibrium framework also di¤erentiates our paper from
Haubrich (1994), who identies the parameter values in the traditional principal-agent model
that would be consistent with the 0.325% e¤ective equity stake found by Jensen and Murphy
(1990). He notes that the large number of free variables makes it relatively easy to match one
moment. We evaluate the ability of a simple neoclassical model to explain the level of incentives
and total pay, and their scaling with rm size and volatility.
In contemporaneous work, Baranchuk, Macdonald and Yang (2007) and Falato and Kadyrzhanova
(2007) also model the equilibrium determination of both total pay and its incentive component.
The former study focuses on the e¤ect of product market conditions on CEO compensation;
the latter analyzes the e¤ect of industry dynamics (in particular the importance of industry
structure and a rms position versus its industry peers.)
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A separate literature to which this paper relates examines the optimality of CEO compen-
sation practices. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that certain features of CEO pay reect rent
extraction; see Kuhnen and Zwiebel (2007) for a recent model of hidden pay. However, others
have argued that such features may in fact be e¢ cient. Examples include the level of total
pay (Gabaix and Landier (2008)), severance pay (Almazan and Suarez (2003), Manso (2006),
Inderst and Mueller (2006)), pensions (Edmans (2007)), and perks (Rajan and Wulf (2006)).
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1 we model equilibrium compensation for a
risk-neutral CEO, generating predictions for the e¤ect of size on incentives. Section 2 studies
the optimal contract for a risk-averse CEO and explores the e¤ect of risk and cost of e¤ort
on pay. Section 3 presents empirical evidence quantitatively consistent with the models main
predictions for the scaling of incentives with rm size. Section 4 considers further implications
of the model and Section 5 concludes.
1 The Basic Model
We start in Section 1.1 by deriving the optimal division of CEO compensation into stock and
cash salary, in a partial equilibrium analysis that takes total compensation as given. In Section
1.2 we embed this analysis into a general equilibrium where total pay is endogenously deter-
mined, and present the implications for pay-performance sensitivity in Section 1.3. Section
1.4 illustrates that these results naturally extend to measures of wealth-performance sensitiv-
ity, where CEO incentives are principally provided by existing security holdings, rather than
ow compensation. Since our objective is to provide calibratable predictions, we maximize
tractability by building a deliberately parsimonious model where the CEO is risk-neutral, the
e¤ort decision is binary, and the contract is restricted to comprise cash and shares. In addition,
risk neutrality gives us one fewer degree of freedom in calibration. Since risk aversion is di¢ cult
to measure accurately, a wide range of inputs can be used, thus making it easier to match the
data. Section 2 will later show that our predictions are robust to relaxing these assumptions,
and analyze the e¤ect of risk on compensation.
1.1 Incentive Pay in Partial Equilibrium
The CEOs objective function is:
U = E [cg (e)] ; (1)
where c is the CEOs monetary compensation and e 2 fe; eg denotes CEO e¤ort. We normalize
e = 0 > e, g (e) = 1 and set g (e) = 1= (1 + e), where  2 [0; 1). Shirking reduces rm
value by a fraction e and increases the CEOs utility by (approximately) a fraction  jej. 
parameterizes the e¤ort cost required to increase rm value by a given amount, which we will
refer to this as the unit cost of e¤ort. The CEO is subject to limited liability (c  0) and has
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a reservation utility of w, the wage available in alternative employment. This is endogenized
in Section 1.2.
Equation (1) is a multiplicative functional form, generalized in Section 2 to other forms
such as E [u (cg (e))]. If the CEO exerts an e¤ort e, which increases the rm value by e%,
he decreases his dollar-equivalent utility by e%. The cost of e¤ort is a given fraction
of his utility. We use this specication as it seems highly plausible that the utility gains
from shirking are increasing in the CEOs wage. For example, shirking allows the CEO to
enjoy consuming goods and services that he can purchase with his salary, and so leisure and
consumption are complementary goods. Multiplicative preferences mean that the share of total
pay allocated to consumption and leisure is independent of the wage changes in salary do not
a¤ect the composition of the bundleof consumption and leisure purchased by the CEO, only
the overall size of the bundle. In addition to a positive consumption-leisure relationship being
psychologically appealing, it also has empirically consistent implications for the scaling of labor
supply with the wage, since it implies labor supply does not have diverging trends over time.1
This empirical consistency explains its common use in macroeconomics, a eld in which models
are frequently calibrated to the data. By contrast, the additive functional forms commonly used
in qualitative corporate nance models (such as E [c]  g (e)) are both arguably less plausible
(implying that the benets from shirking are independent of the wage) and have empirically
inconsistent implications, such as predicting that leisure falls to zero as the wage rises over
time. In Section 4.3 we detail further counterfactual predictions of additive preferences.
The initial stock price is P , and the end-of-period stock price is given by
P1 = P (1 + ) (1 + e) ; (2)
where  is stochastic noise with mean 0. Low e¤ort (e = e) reduces rm value by a fraction e.
We assume that S > w, where S is the rms market capitalization2: the rm value gains
from high e¤ort exceed the managers disutility, and so it is optimal to elicit e¤ort.3
This paper denes e¤ort broadly, to apply to any action that increases rm value but
involves a non-pecuniary cost to the manager. In the literal interpretation, e = 0 represents
high e¤ort and e = e is shirking. A second interpretation is the choice of an investment
project, strategy or acquisition target, where e = 0 is the rst best project and e = e yields the
CEO private benets, such as an empire-building expansion. The e¤ects of e¤ort or project
1For example, consider the labor supply l of a worker living for one period, with a wage w, consumption
c = wl, and utility v (c; l). He solves maxl v (wl; l). If utility is v (c; l) =  (cg (l)), then the problem is
maxl  (wl g (l)), and the optimal labor supply l is independent of w.
2For simplicity, we assume an all-equity rm. If the rm is levered, S represents the aggregate value of the
assets of the rm (debt plus equity) and P denotes the aggregate value per share.
3The proof is as follows. If the manager works, he is paid w and rm value (net of wages) is S   w, leading
to total surplus of S. If the manager shirks, he is paid w(1 + e), to keep his utility at w. Firm value, net of
wage, is V = S(1 + e)  w(1 + e) and total surplus is V + w = S(1 + e)  we. Hence total surplus is higher
if the manager works if and only S  S(1 + e)  we, i.e. (ase < 0), S  w.
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choice plausibly have a proportional e¤ect on rm value, explaining the formulation in equation
(2). However, certain actions have a xed dollar e¤ect independent of rm size, such as perk
consumption or managerial rent extraction through stealing. We consider such additive actions
in Section 4.1.
The CEOs compensation c is composed of a xed cash salary f  0, and  shares:4
c = f + P1: (3)
The optimal contract elicits high e¤ort (e = 0) and pays the CEO his reservation wage,
i.e. E [c] = w. Since the manager is risk neutral (for c > 0), many compensation packages are
optimal. In Proposition 1 below, we derive the contract that minimizes the number of shares
given to the manager, since this would be optimal if the CEO had vanishingly small but positive
risk aversion.
Proposition 1 (CEO incentive pay in partial equilibrium). Fix the managers expected pay at
w and assume  < 1 (the cost of e¤ort is not too strong). The optimal contract pays a fraction
 of the wage in shares, and the rest in cash. Namely, it comprises a xed base salary, f , and
P worth of shares, with:
P = w; (4)
f  = w (1  ) ; (5)
where  is the unit cost of e¤ort. The managers realized compensation is:
c = w (1 +  (r   E [r])) ; (6)
where r = P1=P   1 is the rms stock market return.
In the optimal contract described by Proposition 1, realized CEO compensation is not
indexed to the market and CEOs are rewarded for luck. Therefore, the empirical observation of
these practices (e.g. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001)) need not be inconsistent with optimal
compensation. This result stems from the assumption that the CEO is risk neutral and so the
informativeness principle of Holmstrom (1979) does not apply. In reality, CEOs likely exhibit
some degree of risk aversion, providing a motive for indexation. This is counterbalanced by the
costs of additional complexity in writing indexed contracts. Reality likely reects a trade-o¤
between these two factors.
4Section 2 extends the model to general contracts under risk aversion. In the online appendix (Appendix E)
we show the results are unchanged by generalizing to other instruments, such as options, while retaining risk
neutrality.
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1.2 Incentive Pay in Market Equilibrium
We now embed the previous analysis into a market equilibrium where the equilibrium wage
w is endogenously determined. We directly import the model of Gabaix and Landier (2008)
(GL), the essentials of which we review in the Appendix. There is a continuum of rms of
di¤erent size and managers with di¤erent talent. Since talented CEOs are more valuable in
larger rms, the nth most talented manager is matched with the nth largest rm in competitive
equilibrium, and earns the following competitive equilibrium pay:5
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 = ; (7)
where S (n) is the size of rm n, n is the index of a reference rm (e.g. the median rm in the
economy), S (n) is the size of that reference rm, D (n) is a constant independent of rm size,
and ;  and  are also constants. In particular, CEOs at large rms earn more as they are
the most talented, with a pay-rm size elasticity of  =    =. GL calibrate to  =  = 1,
 = 2=3.
GL only specify the total compensation that the CEO must be paid in market equilibrium.
We now seamlessly incorporate the incentive results of Section 1.1 to determine the form of
compensation. We allow  to di¤er across rms, and so index it n. We need not make any
assumptions on how n varies with n: as long as n < 1 for each rm, e¤ort can be induced
by the incentive contract. Since there is no shirking, the baselinerm value remains at S, as
in GL. The equilibrium incentive pay is analogous to Proposition 1:
Proposition 2 (CEO incentive pay in market equilibrium). Assume 8 n; n < 1 (the cost
of e¤ort is not too strong). Let n denote the index of a reference rm. In equilibrium, the
manager of index n runs a rm of size S (n), and is paid an expected wage:
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 = ; (8)
where S(n) is the size of the reference rm and D (n) =  CnT 0 (n) = (   ) is a constant
independent of rm size. The optimal contract pays manager n a xed base salary, f n, and
nPn worth of shares, with:
nPn = w (n) n;
f n = w (n) (1  n) ;
5Throught this paper, we consider the domain of very large rms, i.e. take the limit n=N ! 0, where N is
the total mass of rms.
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where n is the managers disutility of e¤ort. The managers realized compensation is:
c (n) = w (n) (1 + n (r (n)  E [r (n)])) ;
where r (n) = P1n=Pn   1 is the rms stock market return during the period.
To our knowledge, the above Proposition yields the rst closed-form solution for a market
equilibrium determination of optimal CEO incentives, in a model where CEOs have di¤erent
talents. The most similar antecedent is Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000), which does not have
closed forms.
Note that the total level of pay w(n) is determined entirely by the CEOs marginal product,
and is independent of incentive considerations. The latter only a¤ects the division of total
pay into cash and stock components. Hence high pay is not justiedby the need to reward
CEOs for good performance, or to compensate them for the risk associated with incentive
compensation: CEOs are currently risk-neutral. As in GL, high levels of pay are entirely
justied by scarcity in the market for talent, not by incentive considerations. Simply put, total
compensation is driven by pay-for-talent, not pay-for-performance. Empirically observing
high pay despite poor rm performance need not automatically imply ine¢ ciency, since in a
competitive market, high pay may have been necessary to attract a skilled manager.6 As long
as pay would have been even higher had the manager delivered stronger performance, it can be
consistent with optimal contracting.
1.3 Pay-Performance Sensitivities in Market Equilibrium
The empirical literature uses a variety of measures for pay-performance sensitivity. These are
dened below (we suppress the dependence on rm n for brevity).
Denition 1 Let c denote realized compensation, w the expected pay, S the market value of
the rm, and r the rms return. We dene the following pay-performance sensitivities:
bI =
@c
@r
1
w
=
 lnCompensation
 lnFirm Value
(9)
bII =
@c
@r
1
S
=
$Compensation
$Firm Value
(10)
bIII =
@c
@r
=
$Compensation
 lnFirm Value
: (11)
bI is used (or advocated) by Murphy (1985) and Rosen (1992); bII by Demsetz and Lehn
(1985), Yermack (1995) and Schaefer (1998); and bIII by Holmstrom (1992). The next Propo-
6For example, the large severance package given to Robert Nardelli of Home Depot appears ex post ine¢ cient,
but it may have been necessary ex ante to attract a manager of his talent.
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sition derives predictions for these quantities, in the case where n =  across all rms.7
Proposition 3 (Pay-performance sensitivities). Equilibrium pay-performance sensitivities are
given by:
bI =  (12)
bII = 
w
S
(13)
bIII = w; (14)
where w is given by (7).
Share-based compensation can be implemented in a number of forms, such as stock grants,
bonuses and reputational concerns. If the incentive component is implemented purely using
shares, these sensitivities have natural interpretations. bI represents the dollar value of the
CEOs shares as a proportion of the CEOs total pay, bII is the percentage of shares outstanding
held by the CEO, and bIII denotes the dollar value of the CEOs shares. If the incentive
component is implemented using other methods, the above coe¢ cients constitute the e¤ective
share ownership.
Proposition 4 (Scaling of pay-performance sensitivities with rm size). Let  denote the cross-
sectional elasticity of expected pay to rm size: w / S. For instance, in GL,  =    =.
The pay-performance sensitivities scale in the following way:
1. In the cross-section, bI is independent of rm size:
bI / S0:
2. In the cross-section, bII scales as S 1:
bII / S 1:
3. In the cross-section, bIII scales as S:
bIII / S:
In particular, in the calibration  = 1=3 used in GL,
bI / S0, bII / S 2=3, and bIII / S1=3: (15)
7We make this assumption to maintain the simplicity of our model and limit our degrees of freedom in
calibration. The model can be extended to allow the e¤ort parameters to vary across rms, as in Baker and
Hall (2004).
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Proposition 5 (Dependence of pay-performance sensitivities on the size of the reference rm).
Let n denote the index of a reference rm and S(n) its size. The pay-performance sensitivities
scale with S(n) in the following way:
bI / S0S (n)0
bII / S (1 )S (n) 
bIII / SS (n)  :
where  is the elasticity of CEO impact in GL (equation (38)). In particular, in the calibration
 = 1=3;  = 1, used in GL,
bI / S0S (n)0 , bII / S 2=3S (n)2=3 , and bIII / S1=3S (n)2=3 :
Table 1 summarizes our results for the di¤erent measures of pay-performance sensitivity.
Insert Table 1 about here
Propositions 4 and 5 imply that the log-log measure of pay-performance sensitivity is in-
dependent of both rm size and the size of reference rms. The intuition is as follows. In
our model, e¤ort has a percentage e¤ect on both rm value and the CEOs utility. Since this
percentage is constant across rms, the required %-% (or log-log) incentives to achieve incentive
compatibility should be constant across size.
This result suggests that bI is the most appropriate measure of CEO incentives to use when
comparing between rms or di¤erent time periods. Note that this proposal stems from our
assumption that e¤ort has multiplicative costs and benets. Baker and Hall (2004) show that,
under di¤erent assumptions, bII or bIII may be appropriate. Which assumptions are closest to
reality is therefore an empirical question. Section 3 presents evidence that supports the models
prediction that bI is stable and that other measures are size-dependent.
Proposition 4 also predicts that bII should decline with rm size, a relationship widely
documented empirically. Since bII = bI w
S
and the wage w scales with S1=3 in market equilibrium,
bII is predicted to scale with S 2=3. Existing interpretations of this stylized fact are greater
managerial entrenchment and ine¢ ciency in large rms (Bebchuk and Fried (2004)), stronger
political constraints on high pay in large, visible rms (Jensen and Murphy (1990)), greater
volatility imposing higher risk on the CEO (Schaefer (1998)), and wealth constraints limiting
the percentage of a large rm that a CEO can hold (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). Our explanation
does not rely on any of these constraints; bII optimally falls with size because managerial e¤ort
is multiplicative in rm value and thus substantially increases the dollar value of a large rm.
Therefore, a smaller percentage equity holding is required to induce e¤ort: applied to a large
dollar value change, this creates a su¢ cient incentive to work. It is e¢ cient for CEOs of large
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rms to be paid like bureaucrats, as found by Jensen and Murphy (1990). This point has
been previously noted by Hall and Liebman (1998) and modeled by Baker and Hall (2004); we
form a quantitative prediction for this scaling in market equilibrium.
Finally, bIII is the e¤ective dollar equity stake. Section 1.1 shows that this should be
proportional to total pay. However, since total pay is less than proportional to rm size (it
scales with S1=3), dollar equity holdings should also be less than proportional to rm size.
While this paper models incentive pay as the solution to an e¤ort problem, incentives
can be used for alternative purposes such as screening out low-ability CEOs (Lazear (1995),
Holmstrom (1999)). In future work, it might be interesting to analyze variants of the model
that incorporate other reasons for incentive pay and explore the resulting empirical implications.
By seeing which models predictions most closely match the data, we may understand better
the main motivations for incentive pay in practice: solving agency problems, screening, or
alternative theories.
1.4 Wealth-Performance Sensitivities in Market Equilibrium
Thus far, we have assumed the CEOs incentives stem purely from his ow compensation.
However, for many CEOs, the vast majority of incentives stem from changes in the value of
existing holdings of stock and options (see Hall and Liebman (1998), Core, Guay and Verrecchia
(2003) among others). Appendix B presents a full model that extends the previous results to a
multiperiod setting. The key results are summarized here.
Replacing ow compensation in the numerator of Denition 1 with the overall change in
wealth yields the following denitions of wealth-performance sensitivity:
Denition 2 Let W denote total CEO wealth (including NPV of future consumption), w the
expected ow pay, S the market value of the rm, and r the rms return. We suppress the
dependence on rm n for brevity and dene the following wealth-performance sensitivities:
BI =
@W
@r
1
w
=
$Wealth
 lnFirm Value
1
$Wage
(16)
BII =
@W
@r
1
S
=
$Wealth
$Firm Value
(17)
BIII =
@W
@r
=
$Wealth
 lnFirm Value
: (18)
BII is used by Jensen and Murphy (1990). Hall and Liebman (1998) report both BII and
BIII , as well as a variant of BI where the denominator is ow compensation w plus the median
return applied to the CEOs existing portfolio of shares and options.8
8Note that we scale BI by the wage, not by wealth which may seem more intuitive. The reason is data
limitations: in the U.S., the only wealth data we have is on the CEOs security holdings in his own rm.
Therefore, measured wealth will mechanically have a (close to) constant rm value elasticity for example, if
he holds stock and no options, @Wt@rt
1
Wt
would equal 1.
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Multiplying the pay-performance sensitivities in Proposition 5 by W
w
gives the following
magnitudes for wealth-performance sensitivities:
Proposition 6 (Wealth-performance sensitivities). Let W denote total CEO wealth (including
NPV of future consumption) and w the expected ow pay. Then:
BI = 
W
w
(19)
BII = 
W
S
(20)
BIII = W: (21)
The scalings with rm size S and the size of the reference rm S are as in Propositions 4 and
5.
Proposition 6 predicts that all three measures of wealth-performance sensitivity are higher
for wealthier CEOs. This has been empirically conrmed by Becker (2006) for BII and BIII
(he does not investigate BI). Beckers explanation is that risk aversion declines with wealth,
therefore rendering incentive pay less costly. Our model o¤ers a di¤erent explanation that
does not rely on risk aversion. Since shirking and consuming are complementary goods, higher
wealth raises current consumption and thus the utility gains from shirking. Pay-performance
sensitivity must therefore rise to continue to induce e¤ort.
The numerical scalings for pay-performance sensitivity in equation (15) were obtained using
the well-documented 1/3 elasticity of the wage with size. Using the data from Section 3, in
unreported results we conrm that this elasticity holds for the relationship between wealth
and size: we nd a coe¢ cient of 0.40 with a standard error of 0.05. By contrast, W=w has
an elasticity of 0.04, less than its standard deviation. Note that we only have data on the
CEOs nancial wealth in his own rm (plus accumulated annual ow compensation), and so
our results assume the proportion of own-rm nancial wealth to total wealth is constant across
rm size.
2 ExtendedModel with Risk Aversion and General Con-
tracts
The previous section assumed a risk-neutral CEO, a binary e¤ort decision, and limited our
instruments to cash and shares. This was to maximize the models tractability and thus cal-
ibratability. This section introduces risk aversion and multiple e¤ort levels into a continuous
time setup, and derives the optimal contract without restricting the contracting space. In
addition to testing the robustness of our predictions, the extended model also allows us to
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analyze the e¤ect of risk on compensation. Section 2.1 considers the extended model in partial
equilibrium and in Section 2.2 we embed it in market equilibrium.
2.1 Partial Equilibrium: A Detail-IndependentOptimal Contract
Let e 2 [e; e] denote the CEOs e¤ort. The end-of period rm return on assets, R = P1=P0, is:
R = (1 + )L (e) (22)
where L is continuously di¤erentiable, positive, increasing, and lnL is weakly concave. The
maximum action is normalized to L (e) = 0.  is a random disturbance outside the CEOs
control. ln (1 + ) has a bounded support. We assume that CEO sees the realization of  before
choosing e¤ort e. This assumption substantially simplies the analysis and is discussed in detail
at the end of this subsection.
The CEOs utility function is
u (cg (e)) (23)
where c is terminal consumption, g (e) captures the disutility of e¤ort and is decreasing and posi-
tive, and ln g is concave. u has domainR+, is increasing and weakly concave, and limc!+1 u (c) =
+1. The CEOs reservation utility is u.
The utility function (23) preserves and generalizes (1) in a number of ways. First, the utility
function u can be a general concave function. Second, e¤ort and consumption continue to a¤ect
each other multiplicatively rather than additively. Third, e¤ort is no longer a binary variable.
We consider the case where the highest level of e¤ort, e = e, maximizes total surplus.9
As before, this is optimal under weak assumptions, because the rm (and thus the benet
from e¤ort) is very large compared to the CEO (and thus the cost of e¤ort). The cost of
e¤ort now comprises both the direct disutility and the ine¢ cient risk sharing that results from
incentivizing the manager to exert e¤ort.
At the maximum e¤ort level, if the CEO increases rm returns by 1%, he decreases his
utility (in consumption equivalent units) by %, where:
    (ln g (e))0 = (lnL (e))0 (24)
As in Section 1,  represents the cost of e¤ort: the marginal rate of substitution between
rm value and CEO utility.
The CEO has a reservation utility u (w) given by the competitive market, and we seek the
optimal (unrestricted) contract, a function c (R) of the realized return that implements e = e,
satises the participation constraint U  u, and has the minimum cost E[c] to the rm.10 We
9Lemma 1 in Appendix A shows that this the case if the rm is su¢ ciently large.
10More precisely, the rm minimizes the market value of compensation, i.e. EQc, where Q is the risk-neutral
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can also allow compensation to depend on messages sent by the CEO to the rm, but as shown
in the proof, they have no e¤ect. The optimal contract is derived in Appendix A and stated
below. 11
Theorem 1 (Optimal unrestricted contract, with a risk-averse CEO). The unrestricted optimal
contract pays the CEO an amount W1 dened by:
W1 = W0R
 (25)
where W0 is a constant that ensures that the participation constraint binds (E

u
 
W0R


= u)
and R is the gross rm return at the end of the period. The functional form R is independent
of the utility function u and the distribution of the noise .
The contract in equation (25) has a simple practical implementation, in the case where rm
returns follow a continuous-time di¤usion between period 0 and 1. For simplicity of exposition,
we normalize the interest rates and risk premia to 0. At time 0, the CEO is given a portfolio
of value E[W1], of which a fraction  is invested in the stock and the remainder in cash. This
portfolio is continuously rebalanced between periods 0 and 1, so that the fraction in the stock
remains constant at . The CEOs nal wealth therefore becomes (25).12
Theorem 1 yields a particularly simple optimal contract. We describe it as detail-independent
as its functional form does not depend on the distribution of the noise, nor on the CEOs utility
function these only a¤ect the specic value of W0. In particular, the shape of the optimal
contract R depends only the cost of e¤ort , but not on risk aversion. This simple form
contrasts with the great complexity of traditional contracts under risk aversion (e.g. Grossman
and Hart (1983)).
The link with the optimal contract in Section 1 is as follows. Equation (25) can be rewritten
lnW1=W0 =  lnP1=P0, so that bI = E [@ lnW=@r] = . Changes in log CEO wealth must be
proportional to changes in log rm value, with a constant of proportionality of . Therefore,
nal compensation is proportional to the stock price to the power .
We conclude this subsection with some remarks on our model setup. Our framework makes
three small departures from conventional models. First, we postulate multiplicative production
and utility functions, which lead to scale-independent contracts. Second, the rm always wishes
to implement maximum e¤ort, since the benets of e¤ort outweigh the costs, which removes
the need to analyze small trade-o¤s. Third, the CEO observes the realization of the noise
before taking his action. The combination of these three departures leads to the particularly
probability. This leads to the same solution.
11If the CEO has any initial wealth, the contract is still given by (25), with a fraction  of both existing and
new wealth being continuously invested in the stock.
12The proof is thus. The rm evolves as dPt=Pt = dzt The CEO wealth Vt starts at V0 = E [W1], and for
t 2 [0; 1], evolves at dVt=Vt = dzt, so that d lnVt = dzt   22dt=2, and the nal value of the portfolio is
V1 = E[W1] exp
 
z1   22=2

= RW0:
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simple form of our optimal contract. Note that only the third assumption was deliberately
made to maximize tractability; the rst two were made as we believe they correspond most
closely to the economics of the situation. The third assumption leads to tractability since, if
the CEO observes  before choosing his e¤ort level, the realization of  is immaterial for his
decision problem. (This is shown most clearly in the rst few lines of the proof). Therefore,
the form of the contract is independent of the noise distribution. While it is unclear whether
it is more plausible for noise to be observed prior or after the CEOs e¤ort decision, the online
appendix13 (Appendix D) shows that the optimal contract is exactly the same in a continuous
model, where at each point in time, the CEO exerts e¤ort and stochastic noise occurs. Since the
continuous-time model features e¤ort and noise occurring simultaneously yet attains the same
contract, the economics of Theorem 1 do not depend on the assumption made for the temporal
resolution of uncertainty this only a¤ects tractability rather than driving the results.14 We
suspect that, if we changed the third assumption, the qualitative features of the contract would
be little a¤ected; however, the solution would be substantially more complicated.
We also note that, even though this is a hidden information model (the CEO learn the noise
 before taking the action), there is no need for the CEO to send messages to the rm, and there
is no need for menus of contracts,as shown in detail in the proof. Intuitively, the reason is
that the rm wishes to implement maximal e¤ort in all cases. Hence, on the equilibrium path,
there is a one to one correspondence between the rms return and the noise, which makes
messages redundant.
The simplicity of the contract in Theorem 1 allows it to be easily embedded in market
equilibrium, a task to which we now turn.
2.2 Market Equilibrium
We now derive the market equilibrium with risk averse CEOs, using the optimal contract of the
previous section. To obtain specic quantitative results, we specialize the utility function to
u (c) = c1  = (1   ) for    0,   6= 1, and u (c) = ln c for   = 1. We take the return to be R =
exp (e  e+ "  2=2), where " is a standard Gaussian variable, so that L (e) = exp (e  e).15
We normalize the risk premium and interest rate to 0, and take g (e) = exp ( e), which is
consistent with (24).16 We allow for heterogeneity in the rms cost of e¤ort, scope of e¤ort
13The online appendix can be found at http://nance.wharton.upenn.edu/~aedmans/CEOIncentivesAppendix.pdf.
14The consistency of our contract with a continuous-time setup may explain the supercial similarity between
our contract, where log pay is a¢ ne in log performance, and that of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), where pay
is a¢ ne in performance, even though our setup cannot be mapped into that of Holmstrom and Milgrom.
15Formally speaking, this Gaussian distribution of " is unbounded, contradicting an assuption made in section
2.1. One can approach that condition arbitrarily closely, by truncating the distribution of " to   [A;A], for
some very large, but nite, upper bound.
16If the rms earnings are a0 at time 0, the earnings next period are: a0
 
1 + CT  1

exp
 
e  e+ "  2=2.
The e¤ects of talent, e¤ort, and noise enter all multiplicatively. As in the Online Appendix to Gabaix and Landier
(2008), the net present value of the CEOs action is proportional to the rms market capitalization, to a very
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and volatility.17 The CEO working for rm n receives an expected wage wn. His utility is given
by:
U = u (wn exp ( n)) ;
where
n = nen +
 2n
2
n
2
(26)
denotes the equivalent variationassociated with rm n, i.e. the utility loss su¤ered by the
manager by exerting e¤ort (the nen term) and bearing risk (the  2n
2
n=2 term). The latter
arises because a fraction n is invested in the rm, which has volatility n. After adjusting for
the cost of e¤ort and risk aversion, CEO ns e¤ectivewage is n = wne n.
As in Section 1.2, we derive the market equilibrium with a continuum of CEOs and a contin-
uum of rms. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the rmsns are drawn independently
of rm size. Also, from GL, we recommend the calibration  =  = 1,  = 2=3.
Theorem 2 (Pay and optimal incentive contract in market equilibrium). Let n denote the
index of a reference rm. In equilibrium, the manager of rank i runs a rm whose e¤ective
sizee n=S is ranked i, and receives an expected pay:
wn = D (n)S(n)=S =n exp



(n   )

; (27)
where D (n) =  nCT 0 (n) = (   ), n is as dened in (26) and  is dened by e  =
E

e e=() where e is the average of the rmsequivalent variations. The optimal contract
is as given by Theorem 1, so that the nal payo¤ Wn depends on the gross rm return R
according to:
Wn = wn
Rn
E [Rn ]
; (28)
where E

Rn

= exp (2n (
2
n   n) =2). As before, the wealth-performance sensitivity of CEO i
is bI = E [@ lnW=@ lnR] = , and the scaling with size are as in Proposition 3.
To interpret Theorem 2, rst note that the equivalent variation (26) n increases in the
cost of e¤ort required by the rm (nen) and rm risk (n). A rm with higher equivalent
variation 
n
will, ceteris paribus, choose a lower quality manager (since its e¤ective size is
Sne
 n=), but with a higher pay. This is because the e¤ective size Sne n= leads to a net wage
vn _
 
Sne
 n=
 =
, and a full wage wn = vnen _ S =n en=, which is increasing in n.
Therefore, in the cross-section, rms with high equivalent variations pay more.
However, in the aggregate, there is no such e¤ect: if the equivalent variation of all rms
increases by the same amount , wages do not change. In equation (27), both n and 
close rst-order approximation.
17Cross-sectional variation in en reects the fact that there is greater scope to add value through e¤ort in
certain companies and industries (e.g. those intensive in human capital).
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increase by , so the wage is unchanged: even though working for his present rm becomes
less attractive, the outside options also become less attractive.18 To understand the result,
for clarity we consider the case where all equivalent variations n are the same, n =  = .
The least talented CEO (number N) has a reservation wage wN . To compensate for the above
utility loss, he must be paid wNe
. Hence the pay of CEO n is the following variant of equation
(39):
w (n) =  
Z N
n
CS (s) T 0 (s) ds+ wNe
n (29)
and scales according to
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=

S (n) =   S (N) =

+ wNe
  D (n)S(n)=S (n) =
Changes in  have negligible e¤ect on the the pay of top CEOs, and zero e¤ect in the limit
as n=N ! 0. Equation (29) shows that the pay of CEO n is composed of the rent to talent
(the rst term) and the wage of the least talented CEO (the second term). An increase in 
a¤ects only the wage of the least talented CEO, and does not a¤ect the rent to talent. Since
the rst term is much larger, particularly for highly talented CEOs, the overall wage is barely
a¤ected, and not a¤ected at all in the asymptotic limit of top CEOs.
The main theoretical results of this paper the determinants of incentives and total pay
in market equilibrium can be summarized in just three simple closed-form equations, (26)-
(28).The wage depends on own rm size Sn, aggregate rm size S (n), the supply of talent
D (n), the cost n of e¤ort and risk aversion that the rm imposes on the CEO, the market av-
erage of this cost, . Its incentive component is given by equation (28), an optimal unrestricted
contract with a natural economic interpretation.
3 Empirical Evaluation
This section calculates empirical measures of wealth-performance sensitivity and assesses the
extent to which current practices are consistent with our neoclassical benchmark. Section 3.1
shows that the data is quantitatively consistent with the models predictions for the scalings of
incentives with rm size. In particular, BI is independent of size and we therefore propose it
as the preferred empirical measure of incentives. Section 3.2 calibrates the level of incentives
and show that they can be explained by optimal contracting.
18This assumes that a CEOs only outside option is to become a CEO of another rm. If CEOs can nd a job
outside of the CEO market, the more general prediction is that the cross-sectional elasticity of wage to e¤ort is
higher than the market-wide elasticity.
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3.1 Determinants of CEO Incentives
We start by examining the models predictions for the cross-sectional scaling of incentive pay
with rm size. These are summarized in Proposition 5 for the basic model, and are unchanged in
the extended model. Our model predicts that the dollar-dollar wealth-performance sensitivity,
BII , should optimally decline with size. This directional association has been consistently
documented by a number of existing studies, such as Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Jensen and
Murphy (1990), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Schaefer (1998), Hall and Liebman (1998) and
Baker and Hall (2004). Moreover, our calibratable framework allows us to derive quantitative
predictions of the elasticity of bII with respect to size. Specically,    = = 1=3 (as found
by GL) implies an elasticity of  2=3. Consistent with our model, Schaefer nds BII  S ,
with  ' 0:68.19 Existing research is also consistent with the models prediction that BI is
independent of size (Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Murphy (1999)). We do not know of any
studies that investigate the link between BIII and size.
However, prior ndings cannot be interpreted as conclusive support of the model. Some of
the above studies focus on the compensation ows (salary, bonus and new grants of stock and
options) but do not have full data on the CEOs stock of shares and options which provide the
vast majority of CEO incentives.
We therefore conduct our own empirical tests of the model, using measures of wealth-
performance sensitivity. We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2005) and select the
largest 500 rms in aggregate value (debt plus equity) in each year.20 We calculate the wealth-
performance sensitivities as follows:
BI =
1
wt

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

(30)
BII =
1
St

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

(31)
BIII =

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

(32)
We use the Core and Guay (2002) methodology to estimate the option deltas. (Appendix
C describes our calculations in further detail.) Controlling for year and industry xed e¤ects,
19This  is taken from Table 4 of Schaefer (1998), and is equal to 1 2 (  ) using his notation. We average
over his four estimates of . Note that Schaefer estimates a non-linear model that is closely related to ours, but
not identical, so his ndings only constitute weak support.
20Our results are very similar if we use sales as a measure of rm size, and if we select the top 1000 or 200
rms.
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and clustering standard errors at the rm level, we estimate the following elasticities:21
ln(BIi;t) = +   ln(Si;t)
ln(BIIi;t ) = +   ln(Si;t)
ln(BIIIi;t ) = +   ln(Si;t):
Table 2 illustrates the results, which are consistent with the predictions of equation (15).
Specically, BI is independent of rm size: the coe¢ cient of 0.06 is slightly less than its standard
deviation. BII (BIII) have size elasticities of  0:58 (0.42), statistically indistinguishable from
the models prediction of  2=3 (1/3). Our model can therefore quantitatively explain the size
elasticities of all three measures of wealth-performance sensitivity.
In unreported results, adding the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) governance index as
an explanatory variable yields a coe¢ cient of  0:057, statistically signicant at just greater
than the 1% level. The standard deviation of the governance index is 2.7, implying that a
one standard deviation rise in the index (i.e. a worsening of governance) is associated with BI
falling by 15%.
Insert Table 2 about here
The empirical literature has used a wide variety of measures of CEO incentives, but there
has been limited theoretical guidance over which measure is appropriate. A notable exception
is Baker and Hall (2004), who show that the optimal measure depends on the scaling of CEO
productivity with rm size. If productivity is constant in dollar terms regardless of rm size, bII
(or BII) is appropriate as it is size-invariant; if it is linear in rm size, bIII (or BIII) is the correct
measure as it becomes size-invariant. However, their calibrations estimate the size-elasticity of
CEO productivity of 0.4, in between the two extremes, suggesting that both measures may be
problematic.
Our model predicts that BI is independent of rm size. While this stemmed from our
assumption that e¤ort has multiplicative costs and benets, Table 2 empirically conrms its
size invariance (thus supporting our modeling assumptions) as well as the size dependence of
BII and BIII . This property may render BI an attractive measure of CEO incentives in a
number of empirical applications. Size independence permits meaningful comparisons of the
strength of incentives across rms or over time. In regressions, it ensures that the explanatory
power of the incentives measure does not simply arise because it proxies for size. If size is
included separately as a regressor, it ensures that the coe¢ cient on size is not distorted by the
inclusion of another size proxy (i.e. incentives) on the right-hand side.
21We use the standard panel-data method which assumes the coe¢ cients  are constant across rms. An
alternative approach would be to allow  to vary between rms according to observed characteristics, as in
Hermalin and Wallace (2001). They estimate the pay-performance relationship and that inter-rm di¤erences
will lead to this sensitivity di¤ering between rms. Our focus here is instead the WPS-size relationship, and it
is not clear that this will vary between rms. We therefore use the standard approach.
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The extended model in Section 2 shows that the size scalings are unchanged when intro-
ducing risk aversion and general contracts. It also derives further predictions for the e¤ect of
cost of e¤ort and risk on compensation. As predicted by equation (27), we nd that the wage
is signicantly increasing in rm risk along the cross-section, with a coe¢ cient of 0.61 on log
volatility and a standard error of 0.09. This result is not reported in a table for brevity. Un-
fortunately, we cannot test the related predictions for the cost of e¤ort as this measure cannot
be quantied.
3.2 The Level of CEO Incentives
We now use our model to assess whether currently observed levels of wealth-performance sen-
sitivity are consistent with e¢ ciency. Our primary measure is the log-log pay-for-performance
sensitivity; the other measures are mechanical transformations. The model predicts BI = W
w
(equation (19)). We present gures for 2001, the median year in our sample by level of incen-
tives. The median BI in 2001 is 9.22
We therefore calibrate  = BIw=W = 9w=W . Shirking increases the CEOs utility by a
fraction  jej = 9 w
W
jejof his wealth, i.e. $9w jej in dollar terms. jej is the percentage amount by
which CEO can reduce rm value by shirking or empire-building (through organic expansion or
an acquisition). A natural starting point is the average takeover premium of 30%.23 However,
the takeover premium can be motivated by factors other than managerial misbehavior, such as
synergies or undervaluation. Since a high input for jej would make it easier to match the BI
found in the data, we conservatively set e '  10% which yields  jejW = $0:9w. The current
level of incentive pay is able to deter actions for which the private benets of shirkingincrease
the CEOs utility by an amount no greater than 0.9 times his annual salary.
This appears a high upper bound which incorporates the majority of potential value-
destructive actions, and so it may seem that observed incentives are able to address a number
of agency issues. However, incentives are not e¤ective in two cases: if the utility from shirking
is very high, or the e¤ect on the stock price is low. For certain actions, the private benets from
suboptimal behavior may exceed the upper bound. One example may be managerial entrench-
ment, as by failing to (optimally) resign, the manager retains his salary (plus private benets
of control) in many future years, the present value of which may plausibly exceed his annual
pay.24 Moreover, our estimate of $0:9w hinges upon our chosen input for e (it does not require
an estimation of W=w, since it cancels out). For actions with smaller negative e¤ects on the
22Hall and Liebman (1998, Table VIII) estimate BI = 3:9. Their denominator includes not only ow com-
pensation but also the expected appreciation of the CEOs stock and options.
23Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez and Wolfenzon (2007) quantify the value lost from CEO distraction resulting
from family deaths. Since distraction is not an example of wilful misbehavior, we base our calibrations on the
takeover premium.
24Another example may be acquisitions that substantially boost rm size. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2007) nd
that increases in size lead to higher CEO pay in many future periods.
22
stock price, observed incentives will be too low to deter misbehavior even if it leads to modest
private benets. For example, if a managerialist acquisition or pet project only reduces stock
returns by 1%, the manager will undertake it if the private benets are greater than $0:09w.
We consider these cases in more detail in Section 4.1.
To calibrate  as a percentage of wealth, we would need to estimate W=w. Unfortunately,
there is no data available on the wealth W of U.S. CEOs.25 However, ExecuComp provides
data on a CEOs nancial wealth in his own rm. Across our sample, we estimate a median
value of (Financial wealth in the rm) / (Pay) equal to 9.6. We assume that the CEOs wealth
in his own rm is half his total nancial wealth, and that his human wealth (NPV of future
wages) approximately equals his entire nancial wealth. This leads to an estimate of W=w of
38.4. We therefore have  jej = 9 w
W
0:1 ' 0:9
38:4
= 0:23:This means that, if the CEO shirks, his
utility increases by an amount equivalent to 2.3% of his wealth.
Since BII and BIII are mathematically linked to BI , our ability to explain BI means that
the model can also match the measures of wealth-performance sensitivity more commonly used
by empiricists. For example, BII = BI w
S
. The median size of the top 500 rms in 2001 is $10
billion, with median pay of $4.7 million. BI = 9 is therefore consistent with a Jensen-Murphy
semi-elasticity of BII = 9 ($4:7 million) = ($10 billion). This represents a wealth rise of $4.23
for a $1; 000 increase in rm value, close to our directly measured gure of $3.68.26
4 Extensions
This section considers extensions and other specications of the model. Section 4.1 shows that
actions that are additive in rm value, such as perk consumption, either cannot or should not be
deterred by incentive compensation. In Section 4.2 we show that our model predicts a positive
relationship between rm volatility and wealth volatility, which we support empirically. By
contrast, traditional models that feature an unbounded e¤ort domain have the opposite pre-
diction. Section 4.3 shows that our multiplicative functional forms are necessary and su¢ cient
to explain the size-independence of BI found in the data, since additive specications do not
generate the same prediction. Section 4.4 reconciles our results with the empirical results of
Baker and Hall (2004).
25We thank David Yermack for discussions on this point. See Becker (2006) for a study with Swedish CEOs.
26This gure is smaller than the $5.29 reported by Hall and Liebman because we are considering only the top
500 rms. Across the whole sample, the median is $8.37.
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4.1 Perks
4.1.1 Perks in the Risk-Neutral Model
In the basic model, where the contract consists of cash and shares, the analysis assumed that
 < 1, and thus incentive problems were solvable through the contract specied in Proposition
1. However, if the assumption is violated, the managers disutility from working is so high
that a large equity stake is needed to induce the correct action. If expected pay is kept at
w, this necessitates a negative xed component f , which violates limited liability. One im-
portant agency problem for which  > 1 might apply is CEO entrenchment, since resigning
adversely impacts the CEOs utility in many future periods. Since incentive pay is ine¤ective
at inducing underperforming CEOs to leave, this issue must instead be addressed by corporate
governance, such as active boards. (This solution is also not unproblematic since boards may
be endogenously chosen by the CEO, as modeled by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998)).
Moreover, the necessary condition for incentive pay to be e¤ective is substantially stronger
if the e¤ort decision is additive in rm value. This is likely the case for perks, such as corporate
jets: the value loss from perk consumption is relatively independent of rm size. It also may
hold for managerial rent extraction (e.g. stealing corporate resources).
Proposition 7 (Impossibility of deterring perk consumption through incentive pay). Assume
e = e reduces rm value by $L. Let L > w, so that e = 0 maximizes total surplus. It is
impossible to elicit high e¤ort while keeping expected pay xed at w if S > L=, i.e. the rm is
su¢ ciently large.
Hence if w < L < S, perk consumption is ine¢ cient but cannot be prevented with simply
cash and shares. Since the perk is xed in absolute terms, the stock price of a large rm is
relatively insensitive to perk consumption: stock returns only fall by L=S. (The same holds for
multiplicative actions for which e is small in magnitude, as considered earlier). Therefore, the
CEOs equity stake does not decline su¢ ciently in dollar terms to outweigh the utility gain of
perk consumption. Note that perks cannot be prevented even if the rm is willing to pay the
CEO rents (i.e. a pay in excess of w(n)), by awarding him a large number of shares. Raising
the CEOs pay augments his utility from perk consumption (as this equals w jej) so incentive
compatibility is still not achieved. The only possible solution would be to give the CEO a large
equity stake and reduce his xed salary, to keep his total pay constant, but this is not possible
as f  0.
Although seemingly intuitive, this result is contrary to the view modeled by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and implied by empirical papers such as Jensen and Murphy (1990), that
agency costs can (and should) be addressed by incentive pay. Equity compensation is primarily
e¤ective in addressing agency costs that are a proportion of rm value, such as e¤ort or M&A.27
27For example, Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) nd that higher managerial equity stakes are associated
with greater value creation in mergers.
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However, perks are typically independent of rm value, and thus cannot be addressed by incen-
tives. As with the entrenchment issue, perks should instead be controlled by active corporate
governance. For example, the board could intensely scrutinize the purchase of a corporate jet
or a large investment project. Empirical evidence linking governance to shareholder returns
(e.g. Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Yermack (2006)) can be interpreted as consistent
with this result. If all agency costs could be solved by incentive compensation, governance
would not matter (except for ensuring that the CEO is given the optimal contract). Since in-
centive compensation is not universally e¤ective, there remains an important incremental role
for governance, particularly in large rms.
Overall, these results show that incentives are e¤ective in solving large agency problems,
which have a signicant e¤ect on the stock price, but not smaller issues as these do not a¤ect
stock returns and thus the CEOs portfolio. However, these smaller issues are less important for
overall rm value. Any agency problem that would have a substantial e¤ect on rm value also
would have a substantial e¤ect on stock returns, and so incentives are e¤ective. Any agency
problem that cannot be prevented by incentive compensation, because it has too small an
e¤ect on stock returns, is also less value-destructive if unchecked. Therefore, a greater problem
may be an overcondent CEO. His actions may have signicant negative e¤ects on the stock
price, yet incentives may be ine¤ective at deterring them as he genuinely believes that they are
maximizing shareholder value.
4.1.2 Perks With Risk Aversion and Unrestricted Contracting
We now extend the above result to general incentive contracts. We will see that, although perk
consumption can be deterred through the use of highly sensitive instruments, the required con-
tract would impose substantial risk on the CEO that vastly outweighs the gains from deterring
the perk. Direct control therefore remains the optimal method of perk prevention.
We use the optimal incentive scheme of Theorem 1, which states the optimal contact is
to make the CEO invest a fraction  =  of his wealth in the portfolio. Perk consumption
reduces rm value by L per unit of time and increases the CEOs utility by L, so the net loss
is (1  )L. The ine¢ ciency of perk consumption is thus decreasing in , where 0 <  < 1.
Perk consumption reduces stock returns by L=S, so, if the CEO has a fraction  of his wealth
invested in the rm, the perk consumption reduces the value of his portfolio falls by WL=S.
The CEO therefore avoids the perk if and only if L WL=S  0, i.e.   S=W . Therefore
the optimal contract entails  = S=W .28
To illustrate the extreme sensitivity of incentives required, we consider a simple numerical
example. If  = 1=2, S = $10 billion and W = $100 million, perk prevention requires  = 50.
28This condition can also be derived using the framework of Section 2.1. Consuming perks  e 2 0; L for a
time t impacts CEO utility by g (e) = exp
  eWt, and multiplies rm value by L (e) = exp   eSt. Hence,
the marginal cost of e¤ort (24) is  = S=W , so the optimal portfolio share in Theorem 1 is  = S=W .
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This implies that the CEO must invest 5,000% of his wealth in the rm, borrowing to reach
that amount (and continuously rebalancing, to maintain this exposure to rm return, and avoid
personal bankruptcy). This is clearly extreme, and very costly for any non-trivial level of risk
aversion. The reason for this high sensitivity is that consuming (say) $10 million of perks for
one year reduces the market capitalization by only 0.1%, an amount very hard to detect.
We now quantify the cost of ine¢ cient risk-sharing and compare it to the benets of perk
prevention in a total surplus analysis. Since the CEOs utility is:
U = u

We e  
22=2

;
the loss to total surplus is (per unit of time): W 2 
2
2
= 2 S
2
W
 
2
2
. Total surplus rises with
perk prevention if and only if
LW
S2
 
2
1  
 2
2
.
With   = 1 and 2 = 0:04 (an annual volatility of 20%), the right-hand side is equal to 1%. If
the perk reduces rm value by $10million, the left-hand size is ($10million)($100million)/($104
million)2 = 10 5. Hence, the losses from risk-bearing are several orders of magnitude higher
than the gains from perk prevention. (The exception is for very small rms, where W is of a
similar magnitude to S).
If the relative risk aversion of the CEO,  , is greater than 0.1, any perk less than $1 billion
( 
2
1 
 2
2
S2
W
, should not be deterred via incentives and can only be prevented through monitoring.
If monitoring is not possible, then it is simply more cost-e¤ective to let the CEO consume the
perk, rather than try to deter it by incentives.
We summarize this result in the next Proposition:
Proposition 8 (Perk prevention with general incentive contracts). Perks can be deterred with
general incentive contracts if the CEO receives a share:
   S
W
: (33)
It is e¢ cient to deter perk consumption if and only if:
L  
2
1  
 2
2
S2
W
: (34)
where S is rm size, W CEO wealth,   CEO relative risk aversion,  the rm volatility, and 
the e¢ ciency of perks.
While Proposition 7 could be achieved with simple partial equilibrium models, a calibratable
framework is necessary to extend the result to general contracts (Proposition 8). It quanties
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the cost of risk-bearing imposed by highly sensitive instruments, and shows that this exceeds
the cost of the perk.
4.2 Bounded E¤ort and the Link Between Wealth Volatility and
Firm Volatility
This section shows that the unbounded e¤ort, featured by traditional models, leads to a pre-
dicted negative association between pay volatility and rm volatility. By contrast, our model
has the opposite prediction, which we show to be empirically supported.
We rst briey review the additive (exponential-normal) model. In this model, the CEO
has utility u = E[c]  a
2
var (c)  1
2
e2, where a denotes absolute risk aversion and e 2 [0;1). His
reservation utility is u. Firm value next period is S1 = S (1 + + Le+ ), where L measures
the CEOs productivity, and  is normal noise with mean 0 and variance 2r.  accounts for the
rms expected returns in equilibrium. The rm maximizes S (1 + + Le) E [c], its expected
value next period net of CEO pay. As before, compensation comprises xed pay f , plus 
shares.
The solution is standard.29 The CEOs dollar-dollar-pay-performance sensitivity is bII =
@c=@S1 = L= (L
2 + a2r), and thus is decreasing in rm volatility. This well-known prediction
stems from the fact that there is always an interior solution to the optimal e¤ort level, and
so it reects a trade-o¤ between risk and incentives at the margin. As r rises, the trade-o¤
leads to optimal incentives being lower. By contrast, our model predicts that pay-performance
sensitivity is independent of risk (see Section 1). There is a corner solution and no trade-o¤:
since the rm (and thus the benets of e¤ort) is much larger than the manager (and thus the
cost of e¤ort in terms of risk-bearing), it is always e¢ cient to implement the maximum level
of e¤ort. Indeed, Prendergasts (2002) survey of the evidence nds no systematic negative
relationship between incentives and rm risk. He o¤ers an explanation based on the allocation
of responsibility to employees; ours is a complementary hypothesis.
In addition, models with bounded e¤ort predict a negative relationship between pay volatil-
ity and rm volatility. Since pay volatility is stdev (c) = r = rSL= (L2 + a2r), its sensitivity
to rm volatility is given by @stdev (c) =@r =  S
 
1  2bII bII . Since empirical studies nd
that bII is substantially less than 1=2, these models predict @stdev (c) =@r < 0:, i.e. that the
CEO wealth volatility is smaller in very volatile rms.
By contrast, in our model there is a corner solution to e¤ort and so the number of shares 
is independent of volatility. Hence stdev (c) = r is increasing in volatility. Indeed, we predict
29Normalizing the initial share price to P = 1, the CEOs realized pay is c = f +  (1 + Le+ ). The CEO
chooses e to maximize his utility, U = f +  (1 + Le)  a22r2   12e2, and selects e = L. The rm chooses  to
maximize its net value, S
 
1 + L2
  a22r2   2L22 , and selects  = SL2=  L2 + a2r. The CEOs total pay is
therefore c = f + S1L=
 
L2 + a2r

.
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that the CEOs wealth volatility is proportional to rm volatility, i.e.
stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = BIIIr / Sr; (35)
where r is the volatility of the rms returns and  = 1=3 is the elasticity of pay with respect
to size (see Proposition 4).
We now evaluate these contrasting predictions using the same dataset as before.30 As
discussed more fully in Appendix C, there are two main ways to estimate wealth volatility,
stdev(Wt+1  Wt). The rst is the ex ante measure used in Section 3, i.e. stdev(Wt+1  Wt) =
BIIIt r.
31 The second uses ex post realized volatility, i.e. stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = ln jWt+1  Wtj.
(We calculate wealth by starting with the CEOs initial holdings of stock and options and, each
year, adding the appreciation in value of this portfolio plus any new ow compensation. We do
not have data on the CEOs wealth outside of his rm.) In both cases, the model predicts that
regressing stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = S lnS + S lnr will yield S = 1=3 and  = 1.
We can also scale the dependent variable. Scaling by the wage leads toBIt r or ln (jWt+1  Wtj =wt)
and the model predicts S = 0 and  = 1. Scaling by size yields B
II
t r or ln (jWt+1  Wtj =St),
with a prediction of S =  2=3 and  = 1.
Insert Table 3 about here
The results are shown in Table 3. In all six specications we nd that wealth volatility
is signicantly positively linked to rm volatility. In three specications, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that  = 1. (The low  = 0:64 when ln (jWt+1  Wtj =wt) is the dependent
variable is because of the strong positive association between wt and r.) In addition, in
all six specications, the 95% condence intervals for S contain the predicted values. In
unreported regressions we nd that these results are unchanged when adding rm xed e¤ects
and identifying purely on within-rm changes in volatility.
4.3 The Requirement for Multiplicative Preferences
Our choice of the multiplicative specication (1) was motivated by its intuitive plausibility, in
particular that the benets from shirking are increasing in the wage. Such a functional form
generated the prediction that bI is independent of w, which we have validated empirically. We
now demonstrate that multiplicative preferences are necessary (as well as merely su¢ cient) to
yield this implication.
30The linear-quadratic model is expressed in terms of terminal consumption, but its general meaning is in
terms of terminal wealth. The key variable is the NPV of the CEOs future utilities in the second period, which
is also linear in wealth in the linear-quadratic model.
31Indeed, for small time intervals, Wt+1  Wt =W 0t (r) rt = BIIIrt, so stdev(Wt+1  Wt) = BIIIstdev (rt) =
BIIIr.
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Many previous theories of CEO pay (Haubrich (1994), Schaefer (1998), Baker and Hall
(2004)) are based on the classical additivemodel of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), which
uses the form E [c]  g (e). We explore the implications of this specication while maintaining
the same contract structure (equation (3)). We normalize the expected return to 0, and call bI
the fraction of w invested in stock, so that c = w
 
1 + bIr

. As before, bI = E [@c=@r] =E [c].
With the utility function E [c]  g (e), the optimal bI is given by bI = g(e) g(0)
w
, which implies:32
bI / w 1 (36)
The additive form therefore predicts that bI decreases with the wage. This contrasts with
the multiplicative form (1), which predicts that bI is independent of the wage and is thus
consistent with the data.
Another popular utility function is E [c=]  g (e), with  2 (0; 1]. This leads to bI / w 
for large w, and thus also predicts that bI declines with rm size. The reason is that, for
su¢ ciently high consumption, e¤ort has a very small e¤ect on the agents utility and so fewer
incentives are required to ensure compatibility.
While the above considered two specic functional forms, we now demonstrate a general
result: that multiplicative preferences are necessary to generate a size-independent bI . To keep
the analysis streamlined, we consider only a highly simplied setup. Consider a general utility
function is E[u (c; e)], with e 2 fe; 0g. Assume the rms return is r = e and that incentive
compensation is implemented with shares, so the rm selects expected pay c and slope bI so
that: c = c
 
1 + bIr

. The optimal contract minimizes c and bI while granting the CEO his
reservation utility of uand eliciting e = 0.33 The next Proposition states that multiplicative
preferences are required for the optimal bI = E [@c=@r] =E [c] to be independent of v (and thus
E[c]).
Proposition 9 (Necessity and su¢ ciency of multiplicative preferences to generate a size-independent
bI). Assume the CEOs utility function is u (c; e), and the rms return is r = e. Suppose the
optimal a¢ ne contract involves a wage-scaled pay-performance sensitivity bI = E [@c=@r] =E [c]
that is is independent of E [c]. Then, the utility function is multiplicative in consumption and
e¤ort, i.e. can be written:
u (c; e) =  (c  g (e)) (37)
for some functions  and g.
Conversely, if preferences are of the type (37), then the optimal contract has a slope bI that
is independent of E [c].
32The proof is as follows. The optimal bI is the smallest bI such that E [c  g (0) j e = 0] 
E [c  g ( 1) j e =  1], and so satises E [c  g (0) j e = 0] = E [c  g ( 1) j e =  1]. Since c = w  1 + bIr =
w
 
1 + bI (e+ )

, the conditions read: w   g (0) = w  1  bI  g ( 1), i.e. bI = g( 1) g(0)w .
33More fully, v = E [v (c; e) j e = 0]  E [v (c; e) j e = e].
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This result may be relevant for future calibratable models of corporate nance. While the
level of incentives (a single number) can potentially be explained by a number of di¤erent
models, the requirement to quantitatively explain scalings across rms of di¤erent sizes implies
a tight constraint on the specications that can be assumed.
We note that the above Proposition was proven in a restrictive context, with no noise and
restricting the contract to consist of cash and shares, although we considered a general utility
function. We suspect that the results extend to more general settings, but such an investigation
is beyond the central objective of this paper.34
4.4 Explaining Baker-Hall
Finally, we illustrate how our model can explain Baker and Halls (2004) empirical results on
the negative relationship between BII and rm size. They assume an additive model, which
requires L to be size-dependent in order to predict that BII scales with size. They therefore
use their results to calibrate the scaling of L with size. We show that their ndings are also
consistent with our model, in which L is constant and size-dependence is instead generated by
the multiplicative functional form.
Using our notation, Baker and Hall estimate a functional form for L(e; S). They derive an
equation for CEO productivity as a function of rm size: IBH =
q
2bIIa
1 bII rS (their equation
(3)), where a is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion.35 They assume constant relative risk
aversion, and so a is inversely proportional to the CEOs wealth.
They then make one of three assumptions for the scaling of the CEOs wealth, which leads
to three di¤erent specications. In their specication (1), they assume wealth is proportional
to the CEOs wage, and so a / w 1. In our model, w / S and so a / 1=w / S . In
addition, bII / w=S / S 1 and 1  bII / S0, since bII  1. Assuming stock price volatility is
independent of rm size (as in the geometric random growth model),36 the standard deviation
of the dollar value of a rm is r / S1. We therefore predict IBH1 / S( 1 )=2+1 = S1=2. Our
predicted elasticity of 1
2
is consistent with Baker and Halls empirical nding of 0.4.
In their specication (3), they assume the CEOs wealth is independent of size, and therefore
a / S0. In our model, this would lead to IBH3 / S( 1)=2+1 = S(1+)=2 = S2=3, using  = 1=3,
and thus a predicted elasticity of 0.67. Baker and Hall nd an elasticity of 0.62. We therefore
conclude that the Baker and Hall results can also be explained quantitatively by our framework.
34For instance, with noise, we suspect that to keep b constant across expected utilities, the function  must
actually be:  (c) = A ln c +B or Ac1  = (1   ) +B.
35Baker and Hall (2004) use  to denote absolute risk aversion; we are using a to avoid confusion with our
, which denotes the elasticity of total pay with respect to rm size. Also, we use  to note the percentage
volatility of the rm.
36Regressing log volatility on log aggregate value, year dummies and industry dummies yields an insignicant
coe¢ cient of -0.0024 (standard error of 0.0119).
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5 Conclusion
This paper has presented a calibratable model of the competitive determination of the CEO
compensation contract. There are two main theoretical contributions. First, it is a market
equilibrium model endogenizing the level of total pay as well as its incentive component. As
such, it is a unied framework for understanding the e¤ect of many factors on the two main
components of executive compensation. Second, it is particularly tractable and yields closed-
form solutions, even when the model is extended to incorporate general incentive contracts.
These features lead to clear empirical predictions and readily lend the model to empirical
analysis. The main implications are as follows:
(i) Dollar-dollar incentives (such as those calculated by Jensen and Murphy (1990)) opti-
mally decline with rm size, with an elasticity of -2/3. Therefore, the negative scaling observed
empirically is fully consistent with optimal contracting and need not reect ine¢ ciency. Relat-
edly, dollar-log incentives should have a size elasticity of 1/3.
(ii) Scaled wealth-performance sensitivity (the dollar change in wealth for a percentage
change in rm value, scaled by annual pay) is invariant to rm size.
(iii) Increased rm volatility is associated with increased wealth volatility, but does not
a¤ect the incentive component of total pay.
(iv) Higher rm risk and cost of e¤ort lead to greater total pay in the cross-section, partic-
ularly for the least-talented CEOs. However, aggregate-level changes in these variables have no
e¤ect.
(v) Incentive compensation is typically e¤ective at deterring value-destructive actions that
have a large multiplicative e¤ect on rm value. They are ine¤ective at preventing actions with
a xed dollar e¤ect on rm value, particularly in large companies.
(vi) Observed levels of wealth-performance sensitivity are su¢ cient to deter value-destructive
actions that yield private benets no greater than 0.9 times the annual wage.
There are a large number of other potential determinants of compensation upon which the
model is silent. Owing to its tractability and empirical consistency, our model may provide
a useful benchmark on which future models can be built to explore their equilibrium implica-
tions and investigate whether they can explain other observed features of compensation. Ex-
amples include accounting performance measures (which may explain bonuses), entrenchment
and turnover (which may explain severance pay), stockholder-bondholder conicts (which may
explain inside debt compensation), and renegotiation. In addition, there are a number of im-
plications of the current model which we have not yet tested. Are our scalings empirically
consistent in other countries, or are there large discrepancies that may be potential evidence of
ine¢ ciencies? Are CEO incentives increasing in wealth?37 How much of the time series variation
37Given data limitations in the U.S., the only wealth data available is on the CEOs stock and options holdings
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in incentives, documented by Frydman and Saks (2007) and Jensen and Murphy (2004), can
be explained by our model?
One important caveat is that our models prediction that BI is size invariant stemmed
from our assumed functional forms, and other specications would have di¤erent predictions.
We used the quantitative empirical consistency of our model as a partial justication of our
assumptions, and in turn to support our advocacy of BI as an empirical measure. However,
using real-world data to evaluate a frictionless model implicitly assumes that real-world practices
are also reasonably close to frictionless. It could be that an alternative model, with di¤erent
specications to ours and predicting the size invariance of a di¤erent measure, represents the
truefrictionless benchmark, and that this alternative model is empirically rejected because
there are indeed ine¢ ciencies in reality. Perhaps under the hypothetical truespecication,
BI should optimally increase with rm size, and we only observe that it is constant because
ine¢ ciencies are greater in large rms. Further research is needed to evaluate this hypothesis.
In particular, the strongest support for the rent extraction view may come not from observing
that a particular practice is inconsistent with a frictionless model, but from deriving a model
that explicitly incorporates frictions and generates quantitative predictions on their e¤ects on
compensation that closely match the data. Our empirical results suggest that, if the true
specication predicts that BI increases with rm size, ine¢ ciencies would have to scale with
rm size in such a way as to exactly counterbalance the optimal scaling and explain the size
invariance of BI that we nd. For now, our neoclassical benchmark shows that ine¢ ciencies do
not need to be assumed when interpreting various features of the data.
A Detailed Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 The manager should earn his market wage: E [c j e = 0] = w.
We calculate:
E [c j e = 0] = f + P = w
E [c j e = e] = f + P (1 + e) = f + P + P (e) = w + Pe:
The manager chooses e = 0 if:
E [cg (0) j e = 0]  E [cg (e) j e = e] :
in his own rm, and so there is a mechanical link between incentives and measured wealth. However, full wealth
data may be available in other countries (see Becker (2006) for an example).
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Since g (0) = 1 and g (e) = 1
1  , this implies
w  w + Pe
1  e , P  
P = w:
f  is chosen to ensure that expected pay is w: f  = w   P = w (1  ).
Proof of Proposition 2 We rst dene some notation. A continuum of rms and po-
tential managers are matched together. Firm n 2 [0; N ] has size S (n) and manager m 2 [0; N ]
has talent T (m). Low n denotes a larger rm and low m a more talented manager: S 0 (n) < 0,
T 0 (m) < 0. n (m) can be thought of as the rank of the manager (rm), or a number proportional
to it, such as its quantile of rank.
We consider the problem faced by one particular rm. The rm has a baselinevalue of
S. At t = 0, it hires a manager of talent T for one period. The managers talent increases the
rms value according to
S 0 = S + CTS; (38)
where C parameterizes the productivity of talent. If large rms are more di¢ cult to change
than small rms, then  < 1. If  = 1, the model exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) with
respect to rm size.
We now determine equilibrium wages, which requires us to allocate one CEO to each rm.
Let w (m) denote the equilibrium compensation of a CEO with index m. Firm n, taking the
market compensation of CEOs as given, selects manager m to maximize its value net of wages:
max
m
CS (n) T (m)  w (m) :
The competitive equilibrium involves positive assortative matching, i.e. m = n, and so
w0 (n) = CS (n) T 0 (n). Let wN denote the reservation wage of the least talented CEO (n = N).
Hence we obtain the classic assignment equation (Sattinger (1993), Tervio (2007)):
w (n) =  
Z N
n
CS (u) T 0 (u) du+ wN : (39)
Specic functional forms are required to proceed further. We assume a Pareto rm size
distribution with exponent 1=: S (n) = An . Using results from extreme value theory, GL
use the following asymptotic value for the spacings of the talent distribution: T 0 (n) =  Bn 1.
These functional forms give the wage equation in closed form, taking the limit as n=N ! 0:
w (n) =
Z N
n
ABCu + 1du+ w =
ABC
   

n ( )  N ( )+ wN  ABC   n ( ):
(40)
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To interpret equation (40), we consider a reference rm, for instance rm number 250 the
median rm in the universe of the top 500 rms. Denote its index n, and its size S(n). We ob-
tain Proposition 2 from GL, which we repeat here. In equilibrium, manager n runs a rm of size
S (n), and is paid according to the dual scalingequation w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 =,
where S(n) is the size of the reference rm and D (n) =  CnT 0 (n) = (   ) is a constant
independent of rm size.38
Proof of Proposition 5 Take the denition of bII and use  =    =:
bII = 
w
S
= 
D (n)S(n)=S =
S (n)
/ S
 = 1
S(n) =
=
S 1
S(n) 
= S (1 )S (n)
  :
The expressions for bI and bIII obtain similarly.
Proof of Theorem 1 For transparency, we rst present a heuristic derivation, to demon-
strate the essence behind equation (25). We then present the rigorous proof.
A heuristic proof . The IC condition is:
e 2 arg max
e2[e;e]
c ((1 + )L (e)) g (e) (41)
The derivative of the right-hand side of (41) at e = e should be non-negative i.e., using R =
(1 + )L (e):
c0 (R) (1 + )L0 (e) g (e) + c (R) g0 (e)  0;
i.e., using (24),  =   (g0 (e) =g (e)) = (L0 (e) =L (e)):
c0 (R)  c (R) =R  0. (42)
Suppose that IC constraint (42) binds, which we will prove shortly. Then, c0 (R) c (R) =R =
0, which integrates to c (R) = c0R. c0 is chosen to ensure that the participation constraint
binds.
The above gives the spiritof why the Theorem holds. We now turn to a full proof.
The full proof . The problem is a hidden information problem. Using the revelation
principle, after he learns , the agent (the CEO) sends the principal (the rm) a message b
about the value of . He then exerts e¤ort e, and the return R = (1 + )L (e) is realized. The
38The derivation is as follows. Since S = An , S(n) = An  , nT
0 (n) =  Bn , we can rewrite equation
(40) as follows:
(   )w (n) = ABCn ( ) = CBn 
 
An 
=   An ( =)
=  CnT 0 (n)S(n)=S (n) = :
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rm optimizes over the optimal compensation contract, which is a function c (b;R). The IC
constraint is that the agent should report truthfully to the principal, and exerts maximal e¤ort:
8;8b;8e; u (c (b; (1 + )L (e)) g (e))  u (c (; (1 + )L (e)) g (e))
i.e., as u is increasing,
(IC) 8;8b;8e; c (b; (1 + )L (e)) g (e)  c (; (1 + )L (e)) g (e) : (43)
u drops out, which is made possibly by the functional form (23).
The rms problem is to minimize the expected cost E [c (; (1 + )L (e))], subject to the
IC constraint (43), and the reservation constraint E [u (c (; (1 + )L (e)))] = u (w).
We observe that for any optimal contract, we can create a new optimal contract, replacing
c (b;R) by 0 if R 6= (1 + b)L (e). The new contract still satises (43), and has the same cost.
Hence, we restrict ourselves to contracts such that
c (b;R) = 0 if R 6= (1 + b)L (e) : (44)
Economically, this means that the principal pays 0 to the agent if he can infers that, from the
agents truthfully reported b and the realized return, that the agent has not exerted maximum
e¤ort.
Now dene c (R) = c (R=L (e)  1; R). This is the consumption of an agent that exerts
maximum e¤ort and reports the true value of the noise , yielding a full returnR = (1 + )L (e).
Let us rewrite the IC condition (43) in terms of c. Owing to (44), given , the relevant deviations
in (b; e) are only those such that (1 + )L (e) = (1 + b)L (e) So (43) can be rewritten as:
(ICa): 8;8e; c ((1 + )L (e)) g (e)  c ((1 + )L (e)) g (e) (45)
This is exactly (41) above. Hence, by the reasoning of the heuristic proof, we have the
necessary condition that c0 (R)   c(R)
R
 0.
We next prove that the IC constraint (42) binds. Let p (1 + ) denote the density function
associated with 1+, and form the HamiltonianH associated withmin
R
c (R) p (R) dR subject
to
R
u (c (R)) p (R) dR  u (w) and c0 (R)  c (R) =R  0:
H (R) = (c (R) +   u (c (R))) p (R) + h (R) (c0 (R)  c (R) =R) :
We note that the problem is well dened, as it maximizes a linear function of c (), R c (R) p (R) dR,
subject to c () belonging to a convex set, the set of functions c such that R u (c (R)) p (R) dR 
u (w) and c0 (R)  c (R) =R  0:
The rst order condition for the optimality of the contract is the Euler-Lagrange equation:
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@H
@c(R)
  d
dR
@H
@c0(R) = 0, i.e.
(1 +   u0 (c (R))) p (R)  h (R) =R  h0 (R) = 0
When h (R) 6= 0 over an interval, then (42) binds, and c (R) = c0R. If over an interval,
h (R) = 0, then 1 +   u0 (c (R)) = 0, and c (R) is constant. But then, over that interval,
c0 (R) = 0, and (42) implies c (R) = 0. This cannot be reconciled with c (R) = c0R over
the interval where h (R) 6= 0. So, h (R) is never 0 over an interval, and so the contract is
c (R) = c0R
 for some c0 > 0.
We nally prove that c (R) = c0R implies the global IC constraint (45).
For a concave function F , we have F (e)  F (e) + F 0 (e) (e  e). Because lnL and ln g are
concave, lnL+  ln g is concave, and,
 lnL (e) + g (e)   lnL (e) + ln g (e) +  (lnL (e))0 +  ln g (e)0 (e  e)
=  lnL (e) + ln g (e) by (24):
Hence, for any e, L (e) g (e)  L (e) g (e), and
8;8e; c0 (1 + ) L (e) g (e)  c0 (1 + ) L (e) g (e) ;
i.e. (45). The proof is now complete.
Lemma 1 When the rm S is large enough, the CEO should optimally exert high e¤ort.
Proof : Call K (e) the dollar cost to make the CEO exert an e¤ort level e, subject to his
participation constraint E [u (c)]  u (w). Under quite general conditions, K (e) is continuously
di¤erentiable in [e; e].
For instance, with the contract as in Proposition 1, c = c0R(e), where  (e) =   (ln g (e))0 = (lnL (e))0.
The participation constraint is satised with E

u
 
c0R
(e)

= w, which admits a solution as
limc!+1 u (c) = +1. Then, K (e) = c0E

R(e)

. By the implicit function theorem, K (e) is
continuously di¤erentiable.
The rms surplus, net of compensation, is V (e) = SL (e)   K (e). The rm solves
maxe V (e). Since V 0 (e) = SL0 (e)   K 0 (e), we have V 0 (e) > 0 for e 2 [e; e], if S > S =
maxeK
0 (e) =L0 (e). Hence, for S > S, the rm wishes to implement the maximum level of
e¤ort.
We nally have to check that, conditional on a realization of , the rm does wish to
implement maximal e¤ort. This is the case if, for all realizations of , e maximizes the net
surplus: S (1 + )L (e) W0 ((1 + )L (e)) g (e). This is true if S is large enough, and ln (1 + )
has bounded support.
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Proof of Theorem 2 Assume that in market equilibrium, a CEO of talent T (m) receives
an e¤ective wage v (m). If rm n wishes to hire manager m, it must pay him a net wage
v (m), and a dollar wage v (m) en. So its program is: maxmCS (n)
 T (m)   v (m) en, i.e.
maxmCne
 nS (n) T (m) v (n). Firm n behaves like a rm with e¤ective size(e n)1= S (n)
and thus pays the associated wage v = D (n) (e S(n))
=  
Cne
 n=S
 =
. After the
compensating di¤erential, the dollar wage is: w = ven, hence (27).
Proof of Proposition 9 Dene  (c) = u (c; 0), g (0) = 1 and g (e) = 1=
 
1 + bIe

.
Call bI = E [@c=@r] =E [c] the slope. Since bI o¤ers the minimum slope, E [v (c; e) j e = 0] =
E [u (c; e) j e = e], i.e.
u
 
c
 
1 + bIe

; e

= u (c; 0) =  (c)
and so u (c; e) = 
 
c=
 
1 + bIe

=  (cg (e)). Therefore, u (c; e) =  (cg (e)) for all c and
e 2 fe; 0g.
The converse of the proof is immediate, with bI = (1  g (0) =g (e)).
B Multiperiod Model
This Appendix underpins Section 1.4, which extends the pay-performance sensitivity results
of Sections 1.1-1.3 to wealth-performance sensitivity in an intertemporal framework. We use
the setup of Kreps-Porteus (1978), Epstein-Zin (1990) and Weil (1989), so that we have risk
neutrality and smooth consumption over time.39 Let the value function Vt denote the discounted
utility of future consumption:
lnVt = (1  ) ln (ct) +  lnEt [Vt+1]  ett:
For instance, if consumption and e¤ort are deterministic, lnVt =
P1
s=0 
s ((1  ) ln ct+s   et+s).40
For simplicity, we assume  = 1= (1 + rf ), where rf is the equilibrium riskless rate. Let
Wt denote the CEOs wealth (nancial wealth Ft plus the NPV of future pay). The optimal
consumption policy is ct = rfWt= (1 + rf ). The model is most suited for a continuous time
setup, but for expositional reasons, we proceed in discrete time and take the continuous time
limit where applicable.
39As in the core model, risk neutrality signicantly enhances tractability (and thus calibratability). Without
smooth consumption, the model would be degenerate as the CEO consumes everything in a period in which he
shirks.
40This is still a multiplicative model, like (1). The non-log analog would be:
Vt =
h
(1  ) c1 t +  (Et [Vt+1])1 
i1=(1 )
(1  ett)
as shirking for 1 period increases utility only by an amount proportional to t.
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The CEO has a fraction t of his wealth in the rm. The rms return is rt+1 = rf+et+t+1,
where r is the risk-free rate and et 2 fe; 0g. Wealth evolves according to:
Wt+1 = Wt
 
1 + rf + tet + tt+1
  ct+1: (46)
It is well-known that with a logarithmic utility function, the indirect utility of wealth is
lnVt = lnWt + k, where k is a constant independent of wealth.
We now address the incentive compatibility condition. If the CEO shirks at time t, he
increases his utility lnVt by t. On the other hand, his wealth at t + 1 is lower by: Wt =
 Wr (t)t;where Wr = @W=@r. (In our example, Wr = W.) Given that the utility is
lnVt = lnWt + k, shirking increases utility lnVt by:
 lnVt = t+ln (Wt +Wt) lnWt = t+ln

1  Wr (t)t
Wt

= t

  Wr (t)
Wt

+o (t) :
We take the continuous time limit, t! 0. The agent does not shirk if and only if:  Wr(t)
Wt

0, i.e.:
@W
@r
 W (47)
As in Section 1, we select the contract that minimizes the risk in the CEOs pay. It is given by
@W
@r
= W:
Using Denition 2, the wealth-performance sensitivities in Proposition 6 can be easily de-
rived.
While equation (47) makes predictions about the stock of incentives, we also wish to
examine the ow of incentives, i.e. the optimal composition of the CEOs incremental compen-
sation next period. Let W denote the increment in wealth brought by the new compensation.
Assume no consumption for simplicity, and that currently @W
@r
 W so that incentive com-
patibility is achieved. The CEOs new wealth is W 0 = W + W. To maintain incentive
compatibility, we require @W

@r
 W., and so @W 0
@r
 W 0. The least risky contract satisfying
this condition is given by:
@W
@r
= W: (48)
The one-period model of Section 1 predicted exactly (48). Hence, if one accepts the above
selection criterion, then the predictions we obtain for the incentive mix in the ow of compen-
sation are exactly the same as in the one-period model of Section 1, in particular Propositions
3, 4, and 5.
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C Detailed Calculation of BI
We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2005) and each year select the 500 largest rms
by aggregate value (equity plus debt). To calculate aggregate value, we rst multiply the end-
of-year share price (data199) with the number of shares outstanding (data25) to obtain market
equity. To this we add the value of the rms debt, calculated as total assets (data) minus total
common equity (data60) and minus balance sheet deferred taxes (data74). We call this variable
aggval, and it is in millions of dollars.
The CEOs incentives are calculated at the end of each scal year, and stem from his stock
and option holdings. The number of shares held by the CEO is given by ExecuComp variable
shrown. Obviously, each share has a delta of 1; the delta of an option is given by the Black-
Scholes formula:
e dTN
0@ ln   SX +

r   d+ 2
2

T

p
T
1A :
d is the continuously compounded expected dividend yield, given by bs_yield. If this is
missing, we assume it is zero. We also winsorize it at the 95th percentile for each year.
 is the expected volatility of the stock return, given by bs_volat. If it is missing, we replace
it with the mean volatility for that year, given by http://mi.compustat.com/docs-mi/help/
blk_schol.htm. We also winsorize  at the 5th and 95th percentile for each year.
r is the continuously compounded risk-free rate, available from http://mi.compustat.com/
docs-mi/help/blk_schol.htm.
S is the stock price at the end of the scal year, given by prccf.
X is the strike price of the option.
T is the maturity of the option.
The option holdings come in three categories: new grants, existing unexercisable grants, and
existing exercisable grants. The rst four variables in the Black-Scholes formula are available
for all categories. For new grants, X and T are also available. X is given by expric, and T
can be calculated using the options maturity date, exdate. If exdate is unavailable, we assume
a maturity of 10 years. A CEO may receive multiple new grants in each year. We calculate
the delta of each option grant, multiply it by the number of options in the grant (numsecur)
and sum across grants to calculate totaldeltanew, the dollar change in the CEOs newly
granted options for a $1 increase in the stock price. Similarly, we sum numsecur across grants
to calculate numnewop, the total number of newly granted options. While ExecuComp has a
variable (soptgrnt) for the number of newly granted options, it is sometimes di¤erent from the
number obtained by summing across grants. As will become clear later, using the bottom-up
number numnewop is more internally consistent since we are calculating the intrinsic value of
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new grants on a bottom-upbasis.
X and T are not directly available for previously granted options, so we use the methodology
of Core and Guay (2002). Here we summarize the Core and Guay method while stating the
additional assumptions made when data issues were encountered. Since new grants are nearly
always unexercisable, Core and Guay recommend calculating the strike price of unexercisable
options as
prccf -
inmonun - ivnew
uexnumun - numnewop
:
inmonun is the intrinsic value of the unexercisable options held at the end of the year, some
of which stem from newly granted options.
ivnew is the intrinsic value of the newly granted options. This is not directly available from
ExecuComp, but obtained by calculating max(0,(prccf-expric)) * numsecur for each new grant
and summing across new grants.
uexnumun is the number of unexercisable options held at the end of the year.
Again because new grants are nearly always unexercisable, Core and Guay recommend
calculating the strike price of exercisable options as
prccf -
inmonex
uexnumex
:
inmonex is the intrinsic value of the exercisable options held at the end of the year.
uexnumex is the number of exercisable options held at the end of the year.
In some cases, numnewop > uexnumun, i.e. the number of newly granted options exceeds
the intrinsic value of unexercisable options at year end. We interpret these cases as part of the
new grant (numnewop - uexnumun) being exercisable. We therefore calculate the strike price
of exercisable options as
prccf 
inmonex
uexnumex - (numnewop - uexnumun)
:
In a subset of these cases, numnewop > uexnumun + uexnumex, i.e. the number of newly
granted options exceeds the number of total options at year end. In such cases, we assume
that the options held at year end entirely stem from new grants and there were no previously
granted options.
In some cases, ivnew> inmonun, i.e. the intrinsic value of the newly granted options exceeds
the number of unexercisable options. In a subset of these cases, uexnumun > numnewop, i.e.
there are some previously granted unexercisable options, and their deltas need to be taken into
account. We assume that such options are at the money. If ivnew > inmonun and numnewop
> uexnumun, we interpret this as part of the new grant being exercisable and having intrinsic
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value. In such cases, we calculate the strike price of exercisable options as
prccf 
inmonex - (ivnew - inmonun)
uexnumex - (numnewop - uexnumun)
:
If ivnew > inmonex + inmonun but uexnumex > numnewop - uexnumun, i.e. there are
some previously granted exercisable options, and their deltas need to be taken into account, we
assume that these options are at the money.
For the option maturities, Core and Guay recommend assuming a maturity for previously
granted, unexercisable options of one year less than the maturity of newly granted options, if
there were new grants in the scal year. (Where there are multiple grants, we take the longest
maturity option). If there were no grants, Core and Guay recommend a maturity of 9 years.
The maturity of exercisable options is assumed to be 3 years less than for unexercisable options.
If this leads to a negative maturity, we assume a maturity of 1 day. As in Core, Guay and
Verrecchia (2003), we then multiply the maturities of all options by 70%, to capture the fact
that CEOs typically exercise options prior to maturity.
We use these estimated strike prices and maturities to calculate deltaun, the delta for
previously granted, unexercisable options, and deltaex, the delta for previously granted,
exercisable options.
Putting this all together, the dollar change (in millions) in the CEOs wealth for a $1 change
in the stock price is given by
totaldelta = [ shrown + totaldeltanew + max(0,uexnumun-numnewop)  deltaun
+ max(0,(uexnumex-max(0,numnewop-uexnumun)))  deltaex]/1000.
We then calculate our measures of wealth-performance sensitivity:
BIII = totaldelta  prccf
BII =
BIII
aggval
 1000
BI =
BIII
tdc1
 1000:
Since tdc1 is very low (and sometimes zero) in a few observations, we replace such observa-
tions by the 2nd percentile for that year. The units for BII are the dollar increase in the CEOs
wealth for a $1,000 dollar increase in shareholder value, as in Jensen and Murphy (1990).
Note that these ex antemeasures slightly underestimate wealth-performance sensitivity,
since they omits changes in ow compensation. However, this discrepancy is likely to be small:
Hall and Liebman (1998) and Core, Guay and Verrecchia (2003) nd that the bulk of incentives
comes from changes in the value of a CEOs existing portfolio. If the researcher has data on
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the CEOs entire wealth, BI can be estimated using ex post changes in wealth as follows:
Wt+1  Wt
wt
= A+ cBI  rt+1 + C  rM;t+1 + Controls, (49)
where Wt+1   Wt is the change in wealth and rM;t+1 is the market return (returns on other
factors could also be added).41 This compares with our chosen measure of:
BI;ex ante =
1
wt

Value of stock + Number of options @V
@P
 P

; (50)
where V is the value of one option, @V
@P
is the option delta, and P is the stock price.
Even if full wealth data (which includes ow compensation) is available, the ex ante measure
has a number of advantages. First, both data on overall wealth and a long time series are
required to estimate equation (49) accurately. Second, even if such data is available, ex post
measures inevitably assume that wealth-performance sensitivity is constant over the time period
used to calculate the measure. Since the ex ante statistic more accurately captures the CEOs
incentives at a particular point in time, it is especially useful as a regressor since its time period
can be made consistent with the dependent variable. For example, in a regression of M&A
announcement returns on wealth-performance sensitivity (e.g. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny
(1990)), the CEOs incentives can be measured in the same year in which the transaction
was announced. In a similar vein, the ex ante measure is more suited to measuring trends in
executive compensation over time.
Finally, if the researcher only has data on compensation ows, rather than wealth, this typ-
ically signicantly understates wealth-performance sensitivity. However, if the CEO is known
to have limited shares and options, the pay-performance estimate bI will be a reasonable ap-
proximation:
lnwt+1   lnwt = a+ bbI  rt+1 + Controls, (51)
where wt is ow compensation and rt is the rms return. Variations on the above specication
are possible. For example, an alternative dependent variable is 2 (wt+1   wt) = (wt+1 + wt),
which is more robust when wt is close to 0.
41rM;t+1 is added since the CEO may hold investments other than his own rms securities, that move with
the market but not the rms return. For example, consider a CEO whose wealth is entirely invested in the
market, with no sensitivity to rms idiosyncratic return. If equation (49) did not contain the C  rM;t+1 term,
it would incorrectly nd cBI > 0, whereas the true cBI is zero. Since rt+1 proxies for rM;t+1, there is an omitted
variables bias which leads to BI being overestimated.
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Table 1: Comparing Di¤erent Measures of Pay-Performance Sensitivity.
bI bII bIII
Measures
 ln c
 lnS
c
S
c
 lnS
Real variables $sharestotal pay % shares $ shares
WPS analog
$W
 lnS
1
w
$W
$S
$W
 lnS
Used by Murphy (1985) Demsetz-Lehn (1985) Holmstrom (1992)
Rosen (1992) Jensen-Murphy (1990) Hall-Liebman (1998)
Yermack (1995)
Schaefer (1998)
This paper  
w
S
w
Scaling with S bI / S0 bII / S 1 bIII / S
bI / S0 bII / S 2=3 bIII / S1=3
Scaling with S(n) bI / S0S(n)0 bII / S (1 )S (n)  bIII / SS (n) 
bI / S0S(n)0 bII / S 2=3S (n)2=3 bIII / S1=3S (n)2=3
Explanation: This Table shows the three di¤erent measures of pay-performance sensitivity
(WPS denotes wealth-performance sensitivity). c is the realized compensation, w is the expected
compensation, S is the market value of the rm, W is the wealth,  is the cost of e¤ort.  is
the cross-sectional elasticity of expected pay to rm size (w / S) and empirically is around
 = 1=3. The predictions in this table are from Propositions 3, 4 and 5. The symbol /
denotes is proportional to. For instance, bII / S 2=3 means that we predict that bII declines
with size S, with an elasticity of -2/3, and bI / S0 means that bI is constant across rm sizes.
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Table 2: Elasticities of Pay-Performance Sensitivity with Firm Size.
ln(BI) ln(BII) ln(BIII)
ln(Aggregate Value) 0.0648 -0.5778 0.4222
(0.0671) (0.0526) (0.0526)
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed E¤ects No No No
Observations 5,973 5,973 5,973
Adj. R-squared 0.1718 0.3453 0.3618
Explanation: We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2005) and select the 500 largest
rms each year by aggregate value (debt plus equity). We use the Core and Guay (2002)
methodology to estimate the delta of the CEOs option holdings. BI , BII andBIII are estimated
using equations (30)-(32). The industries are the Fama-French (1997) 48 sectors. Standard
errors, displayed in parentheses, are clustered at the rm level. Based on the calibration of
Gabaix and Landier (2008), the model predicts an elasticity of  = 0 for BI ,  =  2=3 for BII ,
and  = 1=3 for BIII :
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Table 3: The Positive Relation between Compensation Volatility and Firm Volatility.
Ex ante measure of volatility Ex post measure of volatility
ln(BIr) ln(B
IIr) ln(B
IIIr) ln

jWt+1 Wtj
wt

ln

jWt+1 Wtj
St

ln jWt+1  Wtj
ln(return vol) 1.0882 1.3327 1.3327 0.6435 0.9659 0.9714
(0.1322) (0.1199) (0.1199) (0.1816) (0.1550) (0.1584)
ln(rm size) 0.0705 -0.5564 0.4436 0.0346 -0.5679 0.4045
(0.0686) (0.0539) (0.0539) (0.0691) (0.0552) (0.0560)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE No No No No No No
Observations 5,973 5,973 5,973 4,035 4,035 4,035
Adj. R-squared 0.2586 0.4478 0.4508 0.1421 0.2916 0.2790
Explanation: We merge Compustat with ExecuComp (1992-2005) and select the 500 largest
rms each year by aggregate value (debt plus equity). We use the Core and Guay (2002)
methodology to estimate the delta of the CEOs option holdings. BI , BII andBIII are estimated
using equations (30)-(32). The industries are the Fama-French (1997) 48 sectors. Standard
errors, displayed in parentheses, are clustered at the rm level. The theory predicts a positive
coe¢ cient between wealth volatility and stock-return volatility, contrary to additive models
with unbounded e¤ort.
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